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Causality between Government Revenue and Expenditure:
Empirical Evidence from Zambia
Mutinta Champita
University of Lusaka
We establish the causality between government revenue and government
expenditure using Granger causality tests within the Vector Auto-Regressive (VAR)
framework. The estimated VAR model includes gross domestic product, exchange
rate and Treasury Bill rates. Granger causality tests found unidirectional causality
running from government expenditure to revenue. This work is founded in
economic theory of public choice and the underlying causality of budget deficits.
Knowledge of the revenue spending nexus will shed more light on the nature of
the intertemporal relationship between government revenue and government
spending and help shape the political economy of fiscal policies.
The results are augmented by forecast error variance decompositions which
suggest that a one standard deviation shock to government expenditure will only
explain about 15% variation in government revenue. The absence of social crises
may explain the weak relationship indicated by forecast error variance. The spendand-tax hypothesis is based on the premise of large-scale social disturbance, crises,
or war, which make it easier for a political system to decide how much to spend
and then adjust tax revenues. In the context of Zambia, these results may indicate
that the political system makes spending decisions in the midst of peace and gets
to adjust revenue policy to finance the budget deficit.
Zambia must emphasise policies that control or place limitations on
government spending to effectively manage budget deficits. Policymakers,
politicians, and civil society will have to prepare themselves and the general public
on the importance of bringing the government budget in balance.
Keywords
revenue, expenditure, Granger causality, vector auto-regressive, Zambia, causality
between government revenue and expenditure: empirical evidence from Zambia
1.0 Introduction
The Zambian government and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have
been in discussion over a possible IMF support programme for Zambia. The
discussion comes after Zambia acquired a series of Eurobonds at a commercial
rate to plug the budget deficits arising from spending stress for the government
budget and is compounded by the delay in implementing cost-reflective pricing
of petroleum and electricity (IMF, 2015).

47

Causality between Government Revenue and Expenditure
The debt dynamics in Zambia closely track the performance of copper
prices on the international market. The fall in copper prices in the 1970s
brought about a corresponding decline in government revenue and led to
an accumulation of substantial external debt during the 1970s through to
the 1990s (Weeks and McKinley, 2006). During this period the government
also depended on revenues from the mines to build hospitals and schools,
general infrastructure development, and provide subsidies on production and
consumption of food.
Fiscal deficits averaged 12.3% of gross domestic product (GDP) in the
1970s, 13.8% in 1980s, and 6% in the 1990s (Whitworth, 2012). By 30
September 1987, mounting debts and defaults on debt servicing forced the
IMF to declare Zambia ineligible to use the general resources of the Fund (IMF,
1988). In 1990, Zambia held elections and multiparty democracy was ushered
in from a one-party dispensation. With a change in the nation’s leadership and
upon negotiation with the IMF, the country was permitted to use the Fund’s
financial resources and loans were issued out to Zambia.
Zambia adopted radical structural reforms of the economy in which many
state-owned enterprises were sold to become privately owned entities in 1992.
These reforms were seen as part of the financing agreement with the IMF and
World Bank. The performance of most of the privatised companies followed
the standard privatisation curve: poor performance before privatisation,
rebounding two to three years after privatisation and declining sharply
thereafter (Serlemitsos and Fusco, 2003). The Zambian government was
hesitant in privatising strategic institutions in the energy, telecommunications,
financial and mining sectors. The losses from these state-owned enterprises,
together with preparations for the 2001 general elections, and Organisation for
African Unity (OAU) summit’s exceptional expenditures created serious budget
problems for the government (AFDB/OECD, 2003).
In 1999, the international financial institutions replaced structural
adjustment programmes with Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). The
PRSPs involved three-year development plans with details of macroeconomic
policies, government spending targets and social development programmes.
This was meant to entrench ownership in the development process by all
stakeholders such as government, civil society organisations, the church, and
business. The international financial institutions then evaluated the PRSPs as
part of the process of reaching the completion point of Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPC). Debt relief would be granted by the international financial
institutions to countries deemed to have performed to the set standards in the
PRSPs. The resources freed from debt relief were to be used to support poverty
reduction strategies. In 2005, Zambia was deemed to have made satisfactory
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progress, and the IMF and World Bank offered US$ 3.90 billion in debt service
relief. The remainder of the debt from multilateral and bilateral creditors was
also expected to be reduced by the respective institutions/entities to provide
their share of assistance required under the HIPC initiative (IMF, 2005).
This paper proceeds as follows: section 2 discusses the motivation for
the paper; section 3 reviews the literature; section 4 presents the model and
methodology; section 5 explains results, and section 6 concludes.
2. Motivation for the paper
In recent years, budget deficits have become chronic. Many countries the world
over have to deal with huge budget deficits, i.e., Portugal, United States of
America, Greece, etc. Zambia is no exception. Budget deficits have been rising,
despite the government commitment to reduce them in the past few years
(Ministry of Finance, 2014). To finance spending, the government has been
contracting both domestic and foreign debts.
The execution of the government budget has its problems such as wasteful
expenditure, un-vouched expenditure, and unaccounted for revenue.s (Auditor
General, 2015). Systems put in place to promote accountability of budget
execution have not been satisfactorily implemented. The spending arrears
rose to an estimated 10 billion Zambian kwacha by 2015. These arrears arose
due to late payments to road contractors, pensions, and electricity imports.
Provision for public participation in budget preparation exists, however the
significant part of this participation only begins after the annual budget has been
presented to parliament, leaving little scope to influence the budgetary outcome
(CSPR, 2010). Fiscal discipline is vital to improve and sustain macroeconomic
stability. Reduction in borrowing to finance fiscal deficit may lead to private
sector investments rising, since lower interest rates are associated with a
higher quantity of project proposals that qualify for implementation, which
raises endogenous investment spending (Aisen and Hauner, 2008). It also helps
reduce vulnerabilities of unexpected shocks to the economy. Large persistent
budget deficits over time may lead to loss of credibility in policy making (The
World Bank, 2004).
It is therefore important to understand the relationship between revenue
and expenditure to enable one devise a strategy for reducing fiscal deficits. Should
government achieve this through raising revenue or reducing expenditures? The
Granger non-causality test can be used to pick out any underlying relationship
that may exist between government revenue and spending in explaining budget
deficits. Knowledge of the underlying relationship can help design appropriate
policy responses in managing budget deficits.
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3.0 Theoretical Literature Review
How budget deficits happen has generated considerable debate in scholarly
literature. Friedman’s (1978) tax-and-spend hypothesis suggests that increases
in tax revenues lead to increases in government spending and therefore
worsening budget deficits. Small interest groups each lobbying for spending to
benefit its members lead to a budget deficit. Correcting budget deficits would
require placing a limit on government revenues, as that would reduce the
appetite for increasing government spending thereby bringing spending in line
with revenues.
The spend-and-tax hypothesis is premised on a growing divergence between
desirable public spending and the limits of the taxation system. Large-scale
social disturbances make it easier for governments to run budget deficits and
raise tax revenues to new levels initially thought impossible without resistance
(Peacock and Wiseman, 1961). There is a likelihood that governments will
spend-and-tax, engaging in deficit financing, increasing state activity during a
period of crisis or social disturbance. Spending rises enable governments to
raise and sustain higher tax revenues without much ado.
The fiscal synchronisation hypothesis suggests that it is the size of the mean
income relative to the median income of the decisive voter that determines the
tax rate and therefore the size of the budget (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). In
this model, individuals are utility maximisers, and it depends on incomes and
leisure. If the decisive voter’s median income lies below the mean income, there
is an incentive for the median voter to choose candidates who favour a rise in
taxes which favours redistribution which raises his utility. If the median income
is higher relative to mean income, it provides an incentive for the median
decisive voter to choose candidates who favour a lowering of taxes which
lowers redistribution and raises his utility. Government spending and revenues
are simultaneously synchronised by the median decisive voter’s actions. The
fiscal synchronisation hypothesis suggests that causality between government
spending and revenue is bidirectional (Elhiraika et al, 2015).
The institutional separation hypothesis is premised on the theory that
there is no causality running between government revenue and spending. The
distinction between the allocation and taxation functions of the government
creates separate institutions (Baghestani and McNown, 1994). The separation
of institutions making revenue and spending decisions is influenced by their
divergent interests and agendas (Hoover and Sheffrin, 1992).
3.1 Empirical Literature Review
Mupimpila et al (2015) used a Vector Error Correction (VEC) model on quarterly
data to test for causality between government tax revenue and government
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expenditure for Botswana. Variables employed included trade openness,
per capita GDP and the interest rates. Findings suggest that past values of
government tax revenues have a negative sign and significantly affect government
expenditure. The results indicate that a fall in tax revenues will cause a rise in
government expenditure supporting the fiscal illusion hypothesis. Past values
of expenditure were also found to affect expenditure significantly. The error
correction term was found to be significant and had the right negative sign.
Nyamongo et al (2007) using monthly data from October 1994 to June
2007 estimated an Error Correction Model to test for the relationship between
government revenue and government expenditure in South Africa. They found
significant error correction terms that indicated the existence of a long-run
relationship between government expenditure and government revenue. The
Granger causality evidence supported the existence of long-run bidirectional
causality between government revenue and expenditure. However, the findings
suggest a lack of short-run causality between the variables. The impulse response
functions results indicate that government expenditure has a positive effect on
itself and causes a permanent effect on revenue. A positive shock of one standard
deviation to government revenue would have a positive permanent effect on
government revenue and it has a permanent effect on government expenditure.
Eita and Mbazima (2008) performed the Granger causality test on the
Namibian government’s revenue and expenditure using time series data
running from 1977 to 2007. Unit root tests suggested that government revenue
and expenditure were stationary in levels and Johansen test for cointegration
suggested existence of two cointegration equations. Using Vector Auto Regression
(VAR) they found the existence of Granger causality from government revenue to
government expenditure. The study failed to reject the hypothesis of no Granger
causality from expenditure to government revenue. The impulse response
functions suggest that government revenue responds positively to shocks from
itself and government expenditure, and that government expenditure responds
positively to shocks from itself and government revenue.
Aladejare and Ani (2012) used a VAR model to test for causality between
government expenditure and government revenue in Nigeria. Annual data
ranging from 1961 to 2010 was used for the study. The findings of the VAR model
suggest that past values of government expenditure have a significant impact
on government expenditure. Results of impulse response function suggest that
government expenditure responds positively to its own shock and government
revenue shock. Government revenue responds positively to changes in its own
shock and expenditure shocks.
Richter and Dimitrios (2013) employed a vector error correction model on
annual data for Greece for the years 1833 to 2009 to test for causality between
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government revenues and government expenditure. Real GDP was included
in the model to capture how the macroeconomy affects the intertemporal
relationship between government spending and government revenues. Richter
and Dimitrios (2013) defined the Granger causality test by reading the joint
F-test for the significance of joint lagged values. The study findings indicated
the existence of causality running from government spending to government
revenues in support of the spend-and-tax hypothesis.
Maynard and Guy (2009) used quarterly data for Barbados from 1985 to 2008
to analyse causality between government spending and government tax revenue.
They included interest rate and real output proxied by the GDP in the specification
of the model. The results from the multivariate model suggest that there exists
a long-run relationship between government spending, revenue, interest rates
and GDP. The findings from the Vector error correction model indicate that
government spending Granger causes taxes. Furthermore, real GDP and interest
rate were found to be insignificant in causing taxes. In relation to revenue, the
findings suggest that only real GDP Granger causes government revenue.
Manage and Marlow (1986) tested for causality between federal
expenditure and receipts for the USA. Using a VAR model they found that that
revenue causes government spending, while government spending does not
cause revenue. In the second specification using real variables of government
expenditure and government revenue, they found that real revenue causes real
government spending while real government spending does not cause real
revenue. Using a third specification considering nominal government outlays
minus interest payment on debt and nominal revenue they found bidirectional
causality between government spending and government revenue.
Dalena and Magazzino (2012) use VAR and VEC Models to test for causality
between government revenue and government spending. Three homogenous
annual data sets were employed spanning the years 1862 to 1913, 1914 to 1946,
and 1947 to 1993. The findings of the VEC model for the years spanning 1862 to
1913 suggest unidirectional long-run causality running from government revenue
to government spending. The error correction terms in the specifications for the
sub year categories were either not significant, or did not have the right negative
sign, and therefore could not form the basis for analysis. The Granger causality test
and the Toda and Yamamoto tests were performed and produced similar results.
In the period between 1862 and 1913 causality ran from government revenue
to government expenditure. Iin the period from 1914 to 1946 causality ran from
government expenditure to government revenue. The period from 1947 to 1993
showed bidirectional causality between government revenue and government
expenditure. The results for the entire period between 1862 and 1993 showed
bidirectional causality between government revenue and government expenditure.
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Fosano and Wang (2002) use an error correction model to test for Granger
causality between government revenue and government expenditure for all the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. The results from the error correction
model show that Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, and Oman have unidirectional
causality running from revenue to expenditure. Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait
have bidirectional causality between revenue and expenditure.
In this study, we extend the literature by employing country-specific data
on Zambia. The data set is recent and much longer than the data traditionally
used in most studies on African countries. This enables us to generate additional
insights for analysis which will bring out characteristics specific to Zambia
underlying causality which ordinarily would be missing if we used cross country
methodologies.
4.0 Methodology
Granger causality tests are performed in the framework of VAR and VEC
models. If the variables are stationary, Granger causality can be analysed
using the VAR framework. However, if the variables are integrated of order
one I(1), the VEC model becomes an appropriate framework to use. The VAR
treats endogenous variables in the system as functions of lagged values of all
endogenous variables. They provide the advantage of being flexible and simple
alternatives to the traditional multiple equation models which impose strong
restrictions on the dynamic nature between macroeconomic variables (Sims,
1980). In a world of rational, forward-looking economic agents, no variable can
be viewed as exogenous. The reduced form of VAR can model macroeconomic
data informatively without imposing very strong restrictions. We represent the
VAR model as;
Yt=GtYt–1+et…………………………………………………………………(1)
Where;
Yt =

[ ] [ ]
Y1,t
Y2,t

, Gi =

g11

g12

, Yt-1 =

[

Y1,t–1
Y2,t–1

]

and et =

[ ]
e1.t

e2,t

Yt is a vector of endogenous variables, Yt–1 is a vector of variables representing
past realisations of Yt, Gi is a vector of constants and et is a (nx1) vector of
white noise innovations, and are serially uncorrelated. The assumption about
the error terms is that they can be contemporaneously correlated such that;
E(et,e’t) =

[

se2

1

se1e2

se1e2

se22

]

= Ω where se1e2 ≠ 0.

Ω is not assumed to be diagonal, i.e., the error terms of individual equations

53

Causality between Government Revenue and Expenditure
can be contemporaneously correlated. Innovations must be correlated with
their own lagged values and uncorrelated with all the right-hand variables of
equations. However, the errors must be uncorrelated through time such that the
variance-covariance matrix must equal;
E(et,e’T =

[ ]
0 0

0 0

, for t ≠ T

Therefore, E(et,e’T) =

{

Ω, if t = T
0 otherwise

4.1 Econometric framework
The multivariate VAR model was specified such that government expenditure is
Granger caused by its own lagged value(s), the lagged value(s) of government
revenue, exchange rate, GDP and Treasury Bill rate in equation (2). Government
revenue is also specified to be Granger-caused by its own lagged value(s) and
lagged value(s) of government expenditure, exchange rate, GDP and Treasury
Bill rate in the VAR model in equation (3). In the empirical literature, we build on
the specification of Dalena and Magazzino, (2012) and Mupimpila et al, (2015)
and augment it with exchange rate and Treasury Bill rate variables:
𝑝

𝑝

Ln𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡  = 𝜗0 +∑ 𝑖=1 𝛼𝑖 Ln𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡 -𝑖 +∑ 𝑖=1 𝛼2𝑖 Ln𝐺𝑂𝑉REV𝑡 -𝑖 +

∑𝑝𝑖=1 𝛼3𝑖 LnEXC𝑡 -𝑖 +
𝑝

∑ 𝑖=1 𝛼4𝑖 LnGDP𝑡 -𝑖 +
∑𝑝𝑖=1 𝛼5𝑖 LnTBILL𝑡 -𝑖 + µt …………………………………………………….……………(2)
𝑝

𝑝

LnGOV𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡  = 𝜗1+∑ 𝑖=1 ß𝑖 Ln𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡 -𝑖 +∑ 𝑖=1 ß2𝑖 Ln𝐺𝑂𝑉REV𝑡 -𝑖 +
𝑝

𝑝

∑ 𝑖=1 ß3𝑖 LnEXC𝑡 -𝑖 + ∑ 𝑖=1 ß4𝑖 LnGDP𝑡 -𝑖 +
∑𝑝𝑖=1 ß5𝑖 LnTBILL𝑡 -𝑖+ vt …………………………………………………….………..……(3)
Where Ln𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡  refers to the log of government expenditure, Ln𝐺𝑂𝑉REV𝑡 
refers to the log of government revenue, Ln𝐺𝑂𝑉EXP𝑡 –i and Ln𝐺𝑂𝑉REV𝑡 –i are
lagged values of government expenditure and revenues respectively. Ln𝐸𝑋𝐶𝑡 −𝑖,,
Ln𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 −𝑖 and Ln𝑇𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑡 −𝑖 and refer to the lagged values of exchange rate,
gross domestic product and TreasuryBill rates. P refers to lag length to be used
in VAR Model and 𝜇𝑡  and 𝑣𝑡  are white noise error terms.
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4.2 Data
The data was obtained from the African Development Bank Social and Economic
data and the World Bank database. We make use of data whose data points are
from 1980 to 2016. Table 1 describes in detail all the variables whose data are
employed in our study for analysis.
4.3 Growth of real Government expenditure and revenue
The %age growth rate of real revenue and expenditure in Zambia is given for
the selected years in Figure 1. Real government revenues and expenditure on
average were falling from 1981 to 2004. In 2005 onwards we observe some
positive growth until 2012. In 2013, real government revenue growth turned
negative until 2016. On the other hand, real government expenditure turned
negative in 2014 all through to 2016.
Table 1: Variable Description
Variable Name

Units of
Measurement

Variable Description

Expected
Sign

Real government United States
revenue
dollar

Central government,
total revenue, and grants
deflated by CPI inflation.

(+)

Real government United States
expenditures
dollar

Central government,
total expenditure and net
lending deflated by CPI
inflation.

(+)

Exchange rate

Ratio

Local currency units
relative to the U.S. dollar.

(+)

Gross domestic
product

United States
Dollar

Value of all goods and
services
produced in a particular
period in Zambia

(+)

Policy variable on 90 day
Treasury Bills

(-)

Treasury
rate

Bill Rate percent
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Figure 1: %age Growth of Real Government Expenditure and Revenue
gov exp
gov rev
Source: Author’s computations.
4.4 Estimation Methods
4.4.1 Unit Root Test
A non-stationary series exhibits an infinite persistence of shocks to the autoregressive process (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). We tested all the variables in our
model for the presence of a unit root. If a time series is stationary after we take
its first difference, then it is integrated of order one I(1) and if it is stationary
after we take its second difference, then it is integrated of order two I(2). Theory
of stationary stochastic processes suggests that economic variables are usually
integrated of order one I(1) and rarely integrated of order greater than two
(Kennedy, 2003).
4.4.2 Application of the VAR
Given that the unit root tests suggest that the variables are stationary in
levels I(0), we make use of the VAR model. The model was specified in LogLinear form as in Dalena and Magazzino( 2012). Government expenditure
is Granger-caused by its own lagged value(s) and the lagged value(s) of
revenue. Government revenue is also specified to be Granger -caused by its
own lagged value(s) and lagged value(s) of government expenditure in the
VAR Model. The VAR model has the advantage of treating all variables as
endogenous, and therefore becomes useful in detecting the flow of causality
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between the variables. We followed the Lag selection criterion in using the
lag length of one (1).
5.0 Results
The full results from estimating equations (2) and (3) are as presented in Table
2. The Granger causality test is presented in Table 2.1. The autocorrelation
test suggests that there are no serial correlations in the residuals. All the
roots of the companion matrix values lie within the unit circle, indicating
a stable VAR system1. We also performed the augmented Dickey-Fuller test
to check for unit root. The findings suggest that the variables do not suffer
from a unit root in levels. Performing the Dickey-Fuller test at lag zero, we
find the log of government revenue, log of government expenditure, log of
GDP, and log of Treasury Bills to be stationary at 5% level of significance. The
log of exchange rate was also found to be stationary in levels at 1% level of
significance2.
We found unidirectional causality which runs from government
expenditure to government revenue in the Granger causality test. Treasury Bill
rate was also found to Granger-cause government revenue and expenditure.
The result findings suggested that exchange rate and GDP do not Granger-cause
government revenue and government expenditure.
The estimated coefficients with the associated standard errors for the
VAR are also given in Table 2 below. Our target model suggests that the lag
of government expenditure has a positive effect on government revenue at 5%
level of significance. The lag of government revenue was found to have no effect
on government revenue. The lags of GDP and exchange rate were found to have
no effect in influencing government revenue. However, Treasury Bill rate was
found to have a significant and negative influence on revenue.
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Table 2: VAR Results
DEPENDENT
VARIABLE

GOVERNMENT
REVENUE

GOVERNMENT
EXPENDITURE

GOVREV (L1)

-0.16

-0.46

(-0.55)

(-0.59)

1.07

1.41

(0.43)*

(0.46)*3

-0.20

-0.13

(-0.32)

(-0.35)

-0.17

-0.08

(-0.28)

(-0.30)

-0.28

-0.28

(0.08)**

(0.08)**4

5.93

3.83

(-4.94)

(-5.28)

GOVEXP (L1)
GDP (L1)
EXCH RATE (L1)
TBILL (L1)
Constant
Source: Author’s computations.

In the non-target model, we found a positive and significant relationship
between the lag of government expenditure and government expenditure. The lag of
government revenue was found to have no significant relationship with government
revenue. The lags of GDP and exchange rate were found to be insignificant in
influencing government revenue. The lag of Treasury Bills rate is found to be highly
significant in influencing government expenditure.
Table 2.1: Granger Causality Test Results
Equation

Excluded

Probability

GOVREV

GOVEXP

0.01*

GOVREV

GDP

0.53

GOVREV

EXCH RATE

0.54

GOVREV

TBILL

0.00**

GOVREV

ALL

0.00**

GOVEXP

GOVREV

0.44

GOVEXP

GDP

0.71

GOVEXP

EXCH RATE

0.80

GOVEXP

TBILL

0.00**

GOVEXP

ALL

0.00**
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5.1 Impulse Response Functions Results
The results of the impulse response functions are reported in Figure 2. We direct
our focus on impulse responses on variables that are found to be statistically
significant in the VAR model. A one-unit shock to government expenditure raises
government revenue in one year’s time and permanently remains at that higher
level, and a one-unit shock to government expenditure raises expenditure
moderately and holds at that level throughout the eight-year forecast. A oneunit shock to Treasury Bills lowers government expenditure after about one
year and continues falling throughout the forecast period. A one-unit shock to
Treasury Bills reduces government revenue after about one year and continues
falling throughout the forecast period.
Figure 2: Impulse Response Functions
icy, logGOVEXP, logGOVREV

icy, logGOVEXP, logGOVEXP
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Source: Author’s computations.
5.2 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
The full results of the Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD) are
reported in Table 3. We direct our focus on the FEVD’s on variables that are found
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to be statistically significant in the VAR model. In the short-run, a one standard
deviation shock to government expenditure accounts for approximately 6%
variation in government revenue only after two years, and it rises to 15% in
the long-run (8-year forecast). A one standard deviation shock to government
expenditure explains approximately 15% to itself in the short-run and rises to
about 17% in the long-run. A one standard deviation shock to Treasury Bill rate
will raise government expenditure by 3% in the in the short-run (second year)
and 15% in the long-run (eight-year forecast). A one standard deviation shock
to Treasury Bill rate will raise government revenue by 3% in the short-run and
by 15% in the long-run.
Table 3: Results of Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
Step

Impulse:

Govtexp

Govtexp

TBill

TBILL

Response:

GovtRev

GovtExp
0

GovtRev
0

GovtExp
0

0

0

1

0.148331

0

0

2

0
0.060864

0.155597

0.029388

0.026392

3

0.10168

0.160711

0.061597

0.057683

4

0.124032

0.163643

0.08833

0.08472

5

0.136491

0.165142

0.109632

0.106619

6

0.143748

0.165773

0.126607

0.124166

7

0.148129

0.165873

0.14026

0.138288

0.150815
8
Source: Author’s computations.

0.165633

0.151355

0.149746

6.0 Discussion and Conclusion
The findings of the Granger causality tests suggest that causality is running from
government expenditure to government revenue. These results are surprising
given that spend-and-tax hypothesis is based on the premise of crises which is
not the case for Zambia. These results are consistent with the findings of Richter
and Dimitrios (2013) for Portugal. In the case of Dalena and Magazzino (2012),
such results correspond to the interwar period in Italy’s history. These results
were puzzling; we sought to understand the strength of the causality running
from government expenditure to government revenue. To do this, we augmented
the Granger causality test with the forecast error variance decomposition.
The results of the forecast error variance decomposition suggest that a one
standard deviation shock to government expenditure will explain about 6%
variation in revenue in two years and will rise to 15% variation in spending in
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eight years. These results suggest that the causality running from government
expenditure to government revenue exists but is not so strong. What then
could be explaining the forecast error variance results? The absence of social
crises may explain the weak relationship indicated by forecast error variance.
There has never been a social disturbance, or war, or epidemic of extreme
proportions in Zambia. The spend-and-tax hypothesis is based on the premise
of large-scale social disturbance, crises, or war which make it easier for the
political system to decide how much to spend and then adjust tax revenues.
In the context of Zambia, these results may indicate that the political system
makes spending decisions in the midst of peace and gets to adjust revenue
policy to finance the budget deficit. This may be partly explained by the various
stakeholders’ groupings who all lobby and expect to benefit from government
expenditure (Bwalya et al, 2009). These findings are indicative rather than
prescriptive for Zambia. Therefore, given that increases in government revenue
are Granger-caused by increases in government expenditure, financing the
budget deficit through raising revenues may not be the most appropriate tool
to reduce budget deficits. Rather, efforts that lead to policies that control, or
place limitations, on government spending must be emphasised. Policymakers,
politicians, and civil society will have to prepare themselves and the public on
the importance of bringing the government budget in balance. Perpetual budget
deficits destabilize the macroeconomy in three ways: firstly, it raises the cost of
borrowing in the economy; secondly, it limits resources available to the private
sector for investment; and thirdly, persistent budget deficits can increase the
national debt.
Endnotes
1
2
3
4

See appendices A3 and A4
See appendix A1
Implies coefficient is significant at 5% level of significance
Implies coefficient is significant at 1% level of significance
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APPENDICES
Appendix A1: Unit Root Test
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test
Variable

Test Statistic 1% critical value 5% critical value

log of government
revenue

-3.348

-3.675

-2.969

log of government
expenditure

-3.496

-3.675

-2.969

Log of GDP

-3.151

-3.675

-2.969

Log of Treasury Bill rate -2.045

-2.453

-1.696

Log of exchange rate
-3.865
Source: Author’s computations

-2.647

-1.950
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Appendix A2: Normality Test
Jarque-Bera Test
Equation

Chi2

Df

prob>Chi2

log of government
revenue

0.083

2

0.95927

log of government
expenditure

0.189

2

0.91002

Log of GDP

2.077

2

0.35404

Log of exchange
rate

1.316

2

0.51796

Log of Treasury
Bill rate

0.912

2

0.63367

ALL
4.577
Source: Author’s computations.

10

0.91761

Appendix A3: Autocorrelation test
Lagrange-multiplier test
Lag

Chi2

Df

prob>chi2

1

24.4164

25

0.49543

2
26.7128
Source: Author’s computations.

25

0.37038

Appendix A4: Stability of VAR System
Roots of the Companion Index

1
.5
0
-.5
-1
-1

-.5

0
Real

.5

Source: Author’s computations.

64

1

